Borrowing in excess of natural ability to repay by Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis
 
 
 
 
 
Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., and Vailakis, Y. (2017) Borrowing in excess of 
natural ability to repay. Review of Economic Dynamics, 23, pp. 42-59. 
(doi:10.1016/j.red.2016.09.006) 
 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/122369/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 14 September 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Borrowing in Excess of Natural Ability to RepayI
V. Filipe Martins-da-Rochaa,b, Yiannis Vailakisc,∗
aSao Paulo School of Economics–FGV, Brazil
bUniversite´ Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, CEREMADE, 75016 Paris, France
cUniversity of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, Scotland
Abstract
The paper aims at improving our understanding of self-enforcing debt in competitive dynamic
economies with lack of commitment when default induces a permanent loss of access to interna-
tional credit markets. We show, by means of examples, that a sovereign’s creditworthiness is not
necessarily limited by the ability to repay out of its future resources. Self-enforcing debt grows
at the same rate as interest rates. If a sovereign’s endowment growth rates are lower than inter-
est rates, then debt limits eventually exceed the natural debt limits. This implies that there is
asymptotic borrowing in present value terms. We show that this can be compatible with lend-
ing incentives when credible borrowers facilitate inter-temporal exchange, acting as pass-through
intermediaries that alleviate the lenders’ credit restrictions.
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1. Introduction
An important issue that arises in dynamic, infinite horizon economies with sequential financial
markets is the specification of borrowing constraints to prevent Ponzi games. Debt constraints
should limit the rate at which agents accumulate debt, but they must be sufficiently loose to
permit the maximum expansion of risk-sharing without introducing unjustified financial frictions.
When there is full commitment, the only requirement imposed on debt limits is that they should
be non-binding at equilibrium.1 This implies that agents’ wealth–defined as the present value of
future endowments–is finite and equilibrium debt, contingent to any event, is bounded from above
by the “natural debt limit” (see for instance Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Acemoglu (2009) and
Miao (2014)). Natural debt limits correspond to what an agent can pay at a contingency by never
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consuming again and using all future income for repayment. They reflect two relevant aspects of
the borrowing capacity: the future resources for repayment and the market value of time (i.e., the
interest rates).
When there is lack of commitment and markets are complete, debt constraints should in addition
be consistent with repayment incentives. Formally, the debt limits must be self-enforcing in the
sense that they are tight enough to prevent default at equilibrium. Intuition suggests that in this
setting, debt should be lower than in the full commitment counterpart. In particular, one expects
that borrowers should be unable to issue debt in excess of their natural ability to repay, captured
by their natural debt limits.
The objective of this paper is to show that this intuition is not correct. In the context of
a general equilibrium model with lack of commitment and credit market exclusion upon default,
we argue (by means of several examples) that equilibrium self-enforcing debt limits can exceed a
borrower’s present value of future resources for repayment.2 As in the example of debt sustainability
proposed by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), the present value of aggregate resources is infinite in
all of our examples. However, it may be the case that the present value of endowments is finite for
some agents and infinite for some others. These are the typical environments we are interested in.
The role of sufficiently low interest rates, first documented by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), is
still important for our result, but we identify a new channel that makes possible self-enforcing debt
to exceed the natural debt limits. We argue that the mechanism comes into play only when there
are at least three agents. To give some insight why this is the case, consider a deterministic economy
with three agents or countries (two of them are referred as rich while the third one as poor) trying
to smooth consumption over periods by trading a one-period bond subject to lack of commitment.
The endowment of one of the rich countries is constant over even periods and grows at a constant
rate over odd periods (and vice versa for the other rich country). The poor country starts with
no endowment at the initial period and enjoys a constant endowment thereafter.3 We show that
there are primitives (preferences and endowments) for which the economy admits a competitive
equilibrium where the poor country faces strictly positive self-enforcing debt limits despite the fact
that its wealth is finite. Moreover, the poor country’s equilibrium debt levels eventually exceed its
natural debt limits.
Why potential creditors ever accept to lend in excess of a debtor’s natural ability to repay?
We argue that this is possible because the poor country provides an intermediation service that
reduces the financial frictions, due to the lack of commitment, imposed on the rich countries. This
service is not related to the country’s future resources and interest rates, so there is no reason
that the borrowing capacity reflects solely the country’s wealth. More precisely, at equilibrium,
the rich countries are not creditworthy (i.e., their debt limits are equal to zero) but they have
strong incentives to trade with each other. The poor country acts as a pass-through intermediary,
borrowing from one country and repaying the other one. In this way, debt is rolled over indefinitely
and eventually exceeds the country’s natural debt limit, with the difference reflecting the market
value of the financial intermediation service the country provides.
2Following the seminal work of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) there is a growing literature studying models with limited
enforceability of risk-sharing contracts where debt repudiation induces exclusion from borrowing but not from saving.
It includes, among others, Cole and Kehoe (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Dutta and
Kapur (2002), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), Krueger and Uhlig (2006), Hellwig and Lorenzoni
(2009), Amador (2012). We refer to Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2014) for a thorough discussion of this
literature.
3This justifies why we refer to this country as poor.
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Our work complements Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)’s analysis of repayment incentives. They
show that debt limits are self-enforcing if, and only if, borrowers can exactly roll over these debt
limits period by period. However, in the two-agents example they analyze, there is no issue on
whether or not the equilibrium debt limits exceed the natural debt limits. This is because in
their example both agents have infinite wealth at equilibrium. We could infer from this that a
sovereign can sustain positive levels of debt only if its wealth is infinite, or equivalently, only if
interest rates are lower than its endowment growth rates.4 Our examples show that a debtor’s
“good reputation” for repayment is endogenously determined at equilibrium and is not necessarily
dependent on whether interest rates are lower than the debtor’s endowment growth rates. Indeed,
repayment incentives are ensured by the bubble property of equilibrium debt limits independently
of the sovereign’s wealth being finite or infinite. However, the level of equilibrium interest rates
does have a preeminent role: the exact roll-over property of debt limits is consistent with the
asymptotic supply of credit only if interest rates are lower than the lenders’ endowment growth
rates.5
The analysis brings additional insights on issues that may be of independent interest. For in-
stance, Example 4.2, where one of the agents has zero endowment but is able to issue positive levels
of debt, allows to connect the intermediation channel to the way money is valued in overlapping
generations economies. Moreover, intermediation is compatible with strictly positive (effective)
risk-less interest rates as shown in Example 4.3.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a general stochastic dynamic economy
with lack of commitment where default amounts to exclusion from credit markets forever. Section 3
discusses (in a general setting) two necessary conditions for sustaining debt in excess of the natural
borrowing capacity: some agents must have infinite wealth and there must be at least three agents.
Section 4 contains our examples and delivers the intuition on how the need for intermediation
allows debtors to borrow more than their natural debt limits. Section 5 concludes. Some technical
results–the one related to the necessity of a market transversality condition may be of independent
interest–are presented in the appendix.
2. Fundamentals and Markets
We present an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with lack of commitment and self-
enforcing debt limits along the lines of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009).
Time and uncertainty are both discrete and there is a single non-storable consumption good. The
economy consists of a finite set I of infinitely lived agents (countries) sharing risks in an environment
where debtors cannot commit to their promises.
2.1. Uncertainty
We use an event tree Σ to describe time, uncertainty and the revelation of information over an
infinite horizon. There is a unique initial date-0 event s0 ∈ Σ and for each date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
there is a finite set St ⊂ Σ of date-t events st. Each st has a unique predecessor σ(st) in St−1 and
a finite number of successors st+1 in St+1 for which σ(st+1) = st. We use the notation st+1  st to
specify that st+1 is a successor of st. Event st+τ is said to follow event st, also denoted st+τ  st,
4This is because if a non-negative and non-zero process satisfies exact roll-over, then it cannot be tighter than a
process with finite present value.
5In our examples, the rich countries (which are the creditors) have infinite wealth at equilibrium.
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if σ(τ)(st+τ ) = st. The set St+τ (st) := {st+τ ∈ St+τ : st+τ  st} denotes the collection of all
date-(t+τ) events following st. Abusing notation, we let St(st) := {st}. The subtree of all events
starting from st is then
Σ(st) :=
⋃
τ≥0
St+τ (st).
We use the notation sτ  st when sτ  st or sτ = st. In particular, we have Σ(st) = {sτ ∈
Σ : sτ  st}.
Remark 2.1. When the environment is deterministic, we abuse notation and denote processes of
the form x = (x(st))st∈Σ by x = (xt)t≥0.
2.2. Endowments and Preferences
Agents’ endowments are subject to random shocks. We denote by yi = (yi(st))st∈Σ the agent i’s
process of positive endowments yi(st) > 0 of the consumption good contingent to event st. Pref-
erences over (non-negative) consumption processes c = (c(st))st∈Σ are represented by the lifetime
discounted utility functional
U(c) :=
∑
st∈Σ
βtpi(st)u(c(st)),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, pi(st) is the unconditional probability of st and u : R+ →
[−∞,∞) is a Bernoulli function assumed to be strictly increasing, concave, continuous on R+,
differentiable on (0,∞), bounded from above and satisfying Inada’s condition at the origin.
Given an event st, we denote by U(c|st) the lifetime continuation utility conditional on st,
defined by
U(c|st) :=
∑
st+τ∈Σ(st)
βτpi(st+τ |st)u(c(st+τ )),
where pi(st+τ |st) := pi(st+τ )/pi(st) is the conditional probability of st+τ given st.
A collection (ci)i∈I of consumption processes is said to be resource feasible if
∑
i∈I c
i =
∑
i∈I y
i.
2.3. Markets
At every event st, agents can issue and trade a complete set of one-period contingent bonds
which promise to pay one unit of the consumption good contingent on the realization of any
successor event st+1  st. Let q(st+1) > 0 denote the price, in units of consumption, at event st
of the st+1-contingent bond. Agent i’s holding of this bond is ai(st+1). The amount of state-
contingent debt agent i can issue is observable and subject to state-contingent (non-negative)
upper bounds (or debt limits) Di = (Di(st))sts0 . Given an initial financial claim ai(s0), we
denote by Bi(Di, ai(s0)|s0) the budget set of all pairs (ci, ai) of consumption and bond holdings
satisfying the following constraints: for every event st  s0,
ci(st) +
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)ai(st+1) ≤ yi(st) + ai(st) (2.1)
and
ai(st+1) ≥ −Di(st+1). (2.2)
Given some initial claim b ∈ R at an event sτ , we denote by J i(Di, b|sτ ) the largest continuation
utility defined by
J i(Di, b|sτ ) := sup{U(ci|sτ ) : (ci, ai) ∈ Bi(Di, b|sτ )},
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where Bi(Di, b|sτ ) is the set of all plans (ci, ai) satisfying ai(sτ ) = b, together with Equations (2.1)
and (2.2) for every successor event st  sτ .
Recall that the Euler equations and the transversality condition are sufficient conditions for
the optimality of agents’ choices. Formally, consider a budget feasible plan (ci, ai) satisfying the
flow constraints (2.1) with equality. If ci is strictly positive, satisfies the Euler equations at every
event st  s0, i.e.,
q(st) ≥ βpi(st|σ(st)) u
′(ci(st))
u′(ci(σ(st))
, with an equality if ai(st) > −Di(st), (2.3)
and the transversality condition, i.e.,
lim inf
t→∞
∑
st∈St
βtpi(st)u′(ci(st))[ai(st) +Di(st)] = 0, (2.4)
then (ci, ai) is optimal in the budget set Bi(Di, ai(s0)|s0).
2.4. Default Punishment
We consider an environment where there is no commitment. Agents might not honor their
debt obligations and decide to default. Such a decision depends on the consequences of default.
Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989) (see also Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)), we assume that a
defaulting agent starts with neither assets nor liabilities, is excluded from future credit but retains
the ability to save (i.e., the agent can purchase bonds). Therefore, agent i’s default option at an
event st is
V i(st) := J i(0, 0|st).
Lenders have no incentives to provide credit contingent to some event if they anticipate that the
borrower will default.6 The maximum amount of debt Di(st) at any event st  s0 should reflect
this property. If agent i’s initial financial claim at event st corresponds to the maximum debt
−Di(st), then the agent prefers to repay its debt if, and only if, J i(Di,−Di(st)|st) ≥ V i(st).
When a process of bounds satisfies the above inequality at every event st  s0, it is called self-
enforcing.7 Competition among lenders naturally leads to consider the largest self-enforcing bound
Di(st) defined by the equation
J i(Di,−Di(st)|st) = V i(st). (2.5)
Since the seminal contribution of Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the literature refers to such debt
limits as “not-too-tight”.
2.5. Competitive Equilibrium
Bonds are in zero net supply. Fix an allocation (ai(s0))i∈I of initial financial claims that satisfies
market clearing, i.e., ∑
i∈I
ai(s0) = 0.
6Since the default punishment is independent of the default level, an agent either fully repays his debt or defaults
totally. There is no partial default.
7Indeed, since the function J i(Di, ·|st) is increasing, for any bond holding ai(st) satisfying the restriction ai(st) ≥
−Di(st), agent i prefers honoring his obligation than defaulting on ai(st).
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A competitive equilibrium (q, (ci, ai, Di)i∈I) consists of state-contingent bond prices q, a resource
feasible consumption allocation (ci)i∈I , a market clearing allocation of bond holdings (ai)i∈I and
an allocation of debt limits (Di)i∈I such that, for each agent i, the plan (ci, ai) is optimal among
budget feasible plans in Bi(Di, ai(s0)|s0). A competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing debt is a
competitive equilibrium for which debt limits are not-too-tight.
2.6. Natural Ability to Borrow
Consider for a moment the benchmark environment with full commitment. In order to prevent
Ponzi schemes, we need to impose debt limits on bond holdings, however, these limits need not be
self-enforcing. To ensure that the debt constraints do not introduce an additional imperfection into
the model, the debt limits should be sufficiently large to permit all justified transfers of income.
In other words, debt limits should never bind at equilibrium. When this is the case, the wealth
of each agent–defined as the present value of future endowments–is finite at equilibrium. To state
this result formally we need to introduce some notation.
Given state-contingent bond prices q = (q(st))sts0 , we denote by p(st) the associated date-
0 price of consumption at st defined recursively by p(s0) = 1 and p(st+1) = q(st+1)p(st) for
every st+1  st. We use PV(x|st) to denote the present value (at event st) of a process x restricted
to the subtree Σ(st) and defined by
PV(x|st) := 1
p(st)
∑
sτ∈Σ(st)
p(sτ )x(sτ ).
Agent i’s wealth W i(st) at event st is then defined as the present value of future income, i.e.,
W i(st) := PV(yi|st).
Observe that W i(st) could be infinite.8 However, if (q, (ci, ai, Di)i∈I) is a competitive equilibrium
in which debt limits never bind, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I, ∀st  s0, ai(st) > −Di(st),
then W i(st) is finite and ai(st) > −W i(st) for every agent i and any event st. It turns out that
the wealth process (W i(st))sts0 is the natural candidate for the (non-binding) debt limits in an
environment with full commitment. Such debt limits are known as the “natural debt limits” or
the “natural ability to repay” (see for instance Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Acemoglu (2009)
and Miao (2014)).
Remark 2.2. Assume that agent i could trade at event st a complete set of bonds with all possible
maturities. No arbitrage would imply that the price at event st of the bond with maturity at a
successor event sτ  st is p(sτ )/p(st). In a such environment, country i could sell at event st the
whole process of future endowments (y(sτ ))sτ∈Σ(st). The proceeds would then be
1
p(st)
∑
sτ∈Σ(st)
p(sτ )yi(sτ ) = yi(st) +
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)W i(st+1).
The term q(st+1)W i(st+1) is the “natural borrowing limit” interpreted as the maximum amount
country i can borrow at event st by selling his future income conditional to the successor event st+1.
This is different from the wealth level W i(st+1) corresponding to the maximum amount of debt
country i can issue contingent to event st+1.
8However, if W i(s0) is finite, then W i(st) is also finite at every st  s0.
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3. Necessary Conditions for Rolling Over Debt
The main goal of this paper is to show, by means of several examples, that there are economies
having competitive equilibria in which an agent can borrow more than his wealth without violating
repayment incentives. Before presenting our examples we review the existing literature and discuss
two necessary conditions for sustaining debt in excess of natural debt limits.
3.1. Related Literature
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that debt limits cannot be simultaneously self-enforcing and
tighter than natural debt limits. Formally, we have the following result.9
Theorem 3.1 (Bulow and Rogoff). Assume that agent i’s wealth is finite. If a debt limit process
Di is self-enforcing and tighter than natural debt limits, i.e.,
∀st  s0, J i(Di,−Di(st)|st) ≥ V i(st) and Di(st) ≤W i(st) <∞,
then Di(st) = 0 at every event st  s0.
In other words, if an agent’s wealth is finite and his debt capacity is bounded from above by his
natural ability to repay, then the threat of credit exclusion is not sufficient to induce repayment
incentives. Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) (see also Bidian and Bejan (2015)) went further and
characterized an agent’s repayment incentives without assuming a priori that his wealth is finite.
They proved the following connection between debt sustainability and rational bubbles on debt
limits.
Theorem 3.2 (Hellwig and Lorenzoni). A debt limit process Di is not-too-tight, i.e.,
∀st  s0, J i(Di,−Di(st)|st) = V i(st),
if, and only if, it allows for exact roll-over, i.e.,
∀st  s0, Di(st) =
∑
st+1st
q(st+1)Di(st+1). (ER)
In other words, an agent can credibly promise to repay a positive amount of debt if, and only if,
this debt can be rolled over indefinitely. A direct consequence of the above characterization result
is that if a process Di of not-too-tight debt limits satisfies the following transversality condition
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)Di(st) = 0, (TC)
then debt cannot be rolled over at infinite, and we must have Di(st) = 0 at every event st 
s0.10 Observe that if Di is tighter than natural debt limits, then it satisfies the transversality
condition (TC).
9The model in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is slightly different than the one presented here. They analyzed repayment
incentives of a small open economy borrowing from competitive, risk neutral foreign investors. In that respect, the
statement of Theorem 3.1 is slightly more general than the original result proved in Bulow and Rogoff (1989). We
show in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2016) that Theorem 3.1 can be obtained as a corollary of the result in Bulow
and Rogoff (1989).
10This is because Di(s0) =
∑
st∈St p(s
t)Di(st) and Di is non-negative.
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An important question is whether the roll-over property (ER) is compatible with market clearing
at equilibrium. Indeed, if an agent is rolling over his debt, then there must be other agents lending
at infinite in present value terms. In the benchmark environment with full commitment and non-
binding debt limits, this is not consistent with lenders’ necessary transversality conditions. When
there is lack of commitment, we present below two conditions that are necessarily satisfied if rolling
over debt is compatible with lenders’ incentives.
3.2. Low Interest Rates
We show that equilibrium borrowing requires interest rates to be low enough such that the
wealth of some agents–but not necessarily the wealth of debtors–is infinite.
Proposition 3.1. Debt cannot be self-enforced if interest rates are such that the aggregate wealth
of the economy is finite. Formally, if (q, (ci, ai, Di)i∈I) is a competitive equilibrium with self-
enforcing debt such that W i(s0) is finite for each agent i, then Di = 0 and there is no trade.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let (q, (ci, ai, Di)i∈I) be a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing
debt. Assume that for each agent i the wealth W i(s0) is finite. Since consumption markets clear,
the present value of each individual consumption process is finite: PV(ci|s0) < ∞ for each i.
Applying Lemma A.1 (see Appendix A) we get the following market transversality condition
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)[ai(st) +Di(st)] = 0. (3.1)
The bond market clearing condition then implies that∑
i∈I
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)Di(st) = 0.
Non-negativity of debt limits implies that each Di satisfies the transversality condition (TC) which
(together with Theorem 3.2) suffices to prove the desired result.
The above result strengthens Proposition 3 in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) since we do not
assume a priori that debt limits are tighter than the natural debt limits. We instead show that this
is a necessary condition when the wealth of each agent is finite. The crucial step in the proof is
the observation that the market transversality condition (3.1) is always satisfied when the optimal
consumption of an agent has finite present value.11
3.3. At Least Three Agents
We show that if an agent can borrow more than his natural ability to repay, then there must be
at least three agents in the economy. We provide below the details of the proof for the deterministic
case since the argument is easy to follow and delivers the economic insight that drives the result.
The proof for the general stochastic environment is more convoluted, and therefore is postponed
to Appendix B.
11In the full commitment environment where debt limits never bind, the market transversality condition (3.1)
coincides with the individual transversality condition (2.4). This is not necessarily the case when there is lack of
commitment since debt limits may bind.
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Proposition 3.2. If there are two agents, debt is self-enforced only if both agents have infinite
wealth. Formally, if (q, (ci, ai, Di)i∈{i1,i2}) is a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing debt
such that W i1(st) <∞ at some event st, then Di1(st) = 0.
Proof of the deterministic case. Assume that one agent, say agent i1, has finite wealth W
i1
0 =
PV0(e
i1) <∞. Assume, by way of contradiction, that Di10 > 0. Using the exact roll-over property
of each debt limit process Di we get that
t−1∑
s=0
psc
i
s + pt[a
i
t +D
i
t] =
t−1∑
s=0
pse
i
s + a
i
0 +D
i
0, for all t ≥ 1.
Since agent i1 has finite wealth, we can deduce from the above equalities that
PV0(c
i1) := lim
t→∞
t−1∑
s=0
psc
i1
s
is also finite. Applying Lemma A.1 we get the following market transversality condition
lim
t→∞ pt[a
i1
t +D
i1
t ] = 0.
Combining the above condition with the clearing of bond markets and the exact roll-over property
of Di1 , we deduce that
lim
t→∞ pta
i2
t = − limt→∞ pta
i1
t = limt→∞ ptD
i1
t = D
i1
0 > 0.
Therefore, there must exist some date τ > 0 such that ai2t > 0 for every t ≥ τ . In particular, Euler
equations (for all periods t ≥ τ) are satisfied with equality and we deduce that
pt
pτ
=
βtu′(ci2t )
βτu′(ci2τ )
, for all t ≥ τ .
This implies that
lim
t→∞β
tu′(ci2t )a
i2
t =
βτu′(ci2τ )
pτ
lim
t→∞ pta
i2
t > 0,
which contradicts agent i2’s individual transversality condition (2.4).
The intuition for Proposition 3.2 rests on the observation that if an agent borrows more than
his natural debt limit at some period τ , then he will indefinitely be a debtor in present value terms.
Market clearing then implies that the other agent must indefinitely be a creditor in present value
terms, a situation which is incompatible with the individual transversality condition.
It follows from Proposition 3.2 that supporting debt in excess of an agent’s natural borrowing
capacity requires the presence of at least two lenders. Combining this result with Proposition 3.1
we get that at least one lender must have infinite wealth. Actually, adapting the arguments in the
proof of Proposition 3.2 we can show that both lenders must have infinite wealth (see Appendix B).
This is precisely what happens in the examples we present in the next section. Two agents with
infinite wealth need the intermediation service of a third agent to alleviate the financial frictions
due to lack of commitment.
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4. Borrowing in Excess of Natural Debt Limits
We present below economies with three agents (countries) having a competitive equilibrium
where one country has the same repayment incentives as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989)–interest
rates are sufficiently high to imply finite wealth levels at every contingency–but succeeds to sustain
positive levels of debt. The celebrated critique of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) to models of reputational
debt does not apply since we exhibit equilibria where one country borrows more than its natural
ability to repay. That is, the country faces not-too-tight debt limits that exceed its wealth levels.
This illustrates that the country’s ability to borrow is not necessarily bounded from above by
the present value of its future income. This is also in sharp contrast with the full commitment
environment where equilibrium debt levels are necessarily tighter than the natural debt limits. We
show that the excess of debt to wealth levels reflects the market value of a financial intermediation
service the country provides to the other two countries.
The first example delivers the basic intuition of the intermediation mechanism and illustratess
how the analysis departs from Bulow and Rogoff (1989)’s no-sustainability result. It also highlights
how the level of interest rates affects not only the debtors’ incentives (as stressed by Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009)) but also the creditors’ incentives. The second example helps to understand how
the intermediation mechanism connects to the way money is valued in overlapping generations
economies. The third example extends the analysis to a stochastic economy and shows that zero
(effective) risk-less interest rates (as it is the case in the previous examples) is not an essential
feature for our results.
4.1. Intermediation Mechanism
Our starting point is a deterministic economy with three agents. More precisely, we consider an
environment with two rich countries, say r1 and r2, that grow unboundedly and a third country, say
p, that is poor (it has no growth). We prove that there exists a competitive equilibrium where the
asset pricing kernel is risk-neutral, and interest rates are constant and positive. Country p sustains
debt in excess of its natural ability to borrow despite the fact that its repayment incentives are
exactly as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
Why Theorem 3.1 does not apply in this setting? This is because Bulow and Rogoff (1989)
restrict the sovereign’s debt limits to be tighter than the natural debt limits. We show that if
we do not impose this add-hoc restriction, debt can be rolled over indefinitely and eventually can
exceed the natural debt limits.
At first glance this may appear obvious. However, given that interest rates are positive and
time-independent, running such a Ponzi scheme requires unbounded supply of credit in the long
run. Why do investors accept to lend asymptotically in present value terms? It is well known that
this is easy to accommodate in a general equilibrium environment with overlapping generations.12
But with risk-averse, infinitely lived foreign investors, one expects the individual transversality
condition to preclude asymptotic lending (as in the full commitment literature on the non-existence
of bubbles).13 However, this is not the case because potential lenders are credit constrained and
12This is what makes bubbles sustainable (see Samuelson (1958), Gale (1973) and Tirole (1985)).
13It is known since the work of Scheinkman (1977, 1988) and Brock (1979, 1982) that asset pricing bubbles are
impossible in an intertemporal equilibrium with infinitely lived traders. Essentially, the argument is that the presence
of a bubble would require asymptotic growth in the asset’s value, and hence asymptotic growth of the wealth of at
least one of the traders at a rate that is inconsistent with the optimizing behaviour of that trader. We also refer to
Santos and Woodford (1997) for a formal presentation and a generalization of these no bubble results.
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they need the poor country to act as a financial intermediary to facilitate inter-temporal exchange.
Indeed, the rich countries r1 and r2 would like to share risks by trading with each other, but
they are not creditworthy (their debt limits are equal to zero). Country p emerges as a credible
borrower, with its creditworthiness stemmed from its intermediation role, helping countries r1 and
r2 to smooth consumption. For this service country p extracts a surplus.
Example 4.1. Fix arbitrary non-negative numbers δ, ωr1 and ωr2 with δ > 0. Consider a
deterministic economy with three countries (p, r1 and r2) where the endowment sequences are
specified below.
County p’s endowments are defined as follows:
yp0 := 0 and y
p
t := δ, for all t ≥ 1.
Country r1’s endowments are defined as follows:
∀t ≥ 0, yr12t+1 := ωr1 and yr12t := ωr1 +
δ
β2t
+
δ
β2t+1
.
In other words,
yr10 = ω
r1 + δ +
δ
β
, yr11 = ω
r1 , yr12 = ω
r1 +
δ
β2
+
δ
β3
, yr13 = ω
r1 , . . .
The endowments of country r2 are defined as follows:
∀t ≥ 0, yr22t+1 := ωr2 +
δ
β2t+1
+
δ
β2t+2
and yr22t := ω
r2 .
In other words,
yr20 = ω
r2 , yr21 = ω
r2 +
δ
β
+
δ
β2
, yr22 = ω
r2 , yr23 = ω
r2 +
δ
β3
+
δ
β4
, . . .
The choice of ωr1 and ωr2 is irrelevant. To fix ideas, we can set them to be equal to zero (see
Figure 1 below). The initial asset positions are set equal to zero: ap0 = a
r1
0 = a
r2
0 = 0.
Proposition 4.1. The economy of Example 4.1 admits a competitive equilibrium with self-
enforcing debt in which country p faces positive not-too-tight debt limits Dpt = δ/(β
t) although its
natural debt limits W pt are finite at equilibrium. Moreover, for t large enough, the debt limits are
strictly larger than the country’s natural debt limits. More specifically, we have
lim
t→∞D
p
t =∞ > δ/(1− β) = lim
t→∞W
p
t .
Proof. We first describe the equilibrium prices, debt limits and allocations.
Let the price sequence q = (qt)t≥1 be defined by qt := β for every t ≥ 1 (i.e., the interest rate r,
defined by 1 + r = β−1, is positive and constant).
Consider the following debt limits: Dr1t = D
r2
t = 0 and D
p
t := δ/(β
t). These debt limits are
not-too-tight under the price sequence q since they allow for exact roll-over.
Let (cr1 , ar1) be the plan defined by cr10 := y
r1
0 − δ, and for every t ≥ 1
cr1t :=
{
yr1t − δ/(βt) if t is even
yr1t + δ/(β
t) if t is odd
and ar1t :=
{
δ/(βt) if t is odd
0 if t is even.
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Let also (cr2 , ar2) be the plan defined by cr20 := y
r2
0 , and for every t ≥ 1
cr2t :=
{
yr2t − δ/(βt) if t is odd
yr2t + δ/(β
t) if t is even
and ar2t+1 :=
{
δ/(βt) if t is even
0 if t is odd.
At every even date 2t, the rich country r1 optimally saves the amount βa
r1
2t+1 = δ/(β
2t) in
order to trade the time-varying endowments
(yr12t , y
r1
2t+1) = (ω
r1 + δ/(β2t) + δ/(β2t+1), ωr1)
in exchange of the constant consumption
(cr12t , c
r1
2t+1) = (ω
r1 + δ/(β2t+1), ωr1 + δ/(β2t+1)).
Figure 1a illustrates this trade pattern when δ = 1 and β−1 = 1.25.
The rich country r2 follows the same strategy at odd dates 2t+1: it saves the amount βa
r2
2t+2 =
δ/(β2t+1) to trade the time-varying endowments
(yr22t+1, y
r2
2t+2) = (ω
r2 + δ/(β2t+1) + δ/(β2t+2), ωr2)
in exchange of the constant consumption
(cr22t+1, c
r2
2t+2) = (ω
r2 + δ/(β2t+2), ωr2 + δ/(β2t+2)).
Figure 1b illustrates this trade pattern when δ = 1 and β−1 = 1.25.
Finally, we define (cp, ap) as follows: cp0 := δ, c
p
t := y
p
t = δ for every t ≥ 1 and apt := −δ/(βt)
for every t ≥ 1. The poor country borrows and consumes the amount δ at the initial period and
then, instead of repaying, it rolls over this debt forever. Figure 2 illustrates this trade pattern
when δ = 1 and β−1 = 1.25 and shows how the poor country acts as a financial intermediator.
We next argue that these allocations are indeed optimal. Observe that (cp, ap) is optimal since
it is budget feasible (with equality), it satisfies the Euler equations (2.3) (this follows from the fact
that consumption is constant) and the transversality condition (2.4) (this is because debt limits
bind infinitely often). Moreover, country p’s wealth (and therefore any of its natural debt limits)
is finite at any period since the interest rate is strictly positive and endowments are bounded from
above. Formally, we have
W pt = δ + βδ + β
2δ + . . . =
δ
1− β , for all t ≥ 1.
The plan (crk , ark) is also optimal since it is budget feasible (with equality) and satisfies the Euler
equations (2.3). Indeed, if arkt+1 > 0 (i.e., agent rk saves at date t), then agent rk is financially
unconstrained and we have crkt = c
rk
t+1. If a
rk
t+1 = 0, then agent rk is financially constrained and
we have crkt ≤ crkt+1. The transversality condition (2.4) is satisfied because debt constraints bind
infinitely many times.
To conclude the proof simply observe that all markets clear by construction.
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) study a stochastic economy where two agents credibly issue
positive levels of debt at equilibrium. In their example, interest rates are such that the wealth of
each agent is infinite. They argue that interest rates matter for debt sustainability to the extent
12
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they are low enough to induce repayment incentives. We can easily modify their example by
adding a third agent and show that the intermediation mechanism offers a different interpretation.14
Repayment incentives depend exclusively on the roll-over property of debt limits (or, equivalently,
on the presence of bubbles in the debt limits) which is independent of the level of interest rates.
However, as shown by our example, the presence of bubbles in the debtor’s debt limits is compatible
with the supply of credit only if there is aggregate lending in the long-run. This requires sufficiently
low interest rates with respect to the potential lenders’ endowment growth rates. In other words,
the level of interest rates also matters to induce strong lending incentives.
4.2. Borrowing Against Zero Wealth
In the competitive equilibrium described in Proposition 4.1, the poor country extracts surplus
for its intermediation service only at the initial date and then exactly rolls over its debt consuming
its endowment from date 1 onwards. In particular, debt limits bind at every period and the poor
country is always on the verge of defaulting. The next example shows that our result does not hinge
on these particular features. Indeed, we provide another example of a deterministic environment
where the poor country has zero endowments. At first glance, one may expect that this country
is irrelevant for inter-temporal exchange purposes. We show that this is not true by exhibiting
a competitive equilibrium where, at every period, the country finances positive consumption by
issuing debt, but never exhausts its borrowing capacity (i.e., debt limits never bind). In particular,
at every period the country extracts surplus for its intermediation service and strictly prefers
repaying its debt (by issuing more debt) than defaulting. In doing this, the country sustains debt
because it facilitates inter-temporal trade. The reason why an agent with zero endowment matters
for intertemporal trade is similar to the one that explains why money is valued in overlapping
generations models like those analyzed by Samuelson (1958), Wallace (1978) or Balasko and Shell
(1981).
Example 4.2. The primitives (β, u(·)) are chosen such that there exists a pair (c, c) satisfying
0 < c < c, c+ c = 1 and βu′(c) = u′(c). (4.1)
Let (ct)t≥0 be a strictly decreasing sequence satisfying βu′(ct+1) = u′(ct) for every t ≥ 0. We can
choose the Bernoulli function u and the initial value c0 such that
15∑
t≥0
ct < c.
Consider the sequence (δt)t≥0 where δ0 := 0 and δt := c0 + . . .+ ct−1 for each t ≥ 1. Observe that
δt+1 = δt + ct, for all t ≥ 0. (4.2)
Moreover, the sequence (δt)t≥0 is strictly increasing and converges to δ∞ :=
∑
t≥0 ct.
14Example 4.3 presented below is in this spirit. The argument though is more involved since we look for an economy
that exhibits positive risk-less interest rates. The whole exercise simplifies a lot if, as in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009),
we look for an economy with zero risk-less interest rate.
15Take for instance c0 < (1− β)c and define u(c) := ln(c) on the interval (0, 1] and extend this function on [1,∞)
such that the assumptions of this paper are satisfied.
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There are three countries (p, r1 and r2) in the economy. The rich countries’ endowments are
defined as follows:
yr1t :=
{
c+ δt+1 if t is even
c− δt if t is odd and y
r2
t :=
{
c+ δt+1 if t is odd
c− δt if t is even.
Country p has no endowments, i.e., ypt := 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.2. The economy of Example 4.2 admits a competitive equilibrium with self-
enforcing debt in which country p faces positive not-too-tight debt limits Dpt = δ∞ although
its natural debt limits are zero. Moreover, at every period t, country p consumes the positive
amount cpt = ct and its debt limits do not bind since a
p
t = −δt > −Dpt .
Proof. We first describe the equilibrium prices, debt limits and allocations.
Let the price sequence q = (qt)t≥1 be defined by qt := 1 for every t ≥ 1 (zero risk-less interest
rates).
Consider the following debt limits: Dr1t = D
r2
t := 0 and D
p
t := δ∞. These debt limits are
not-too-tight under the price sequence q since they allow for exact roll-over.
We let (cr1 , ar1) be defined as follows:
cr1t :=
{
c if t is even
c if t is odd
and ar1t :=
{
δt if t is odd
0 if t is even.
We also let (cr2 , ar2) be the plan defined by cr20 := y
r2
0 , and for every t ≥ 1,
cr2t :=
{
c if t is odd
c if t is even
and ar2t :=
{
δt if t is even
0 if t is odd.
At every even date 2t, the rich country r1 optimally saves the amount δ2t+1 in order to trade the
time-varying endowments (yr12t , y
r1
2t+1) = (c + δ2t+1, c − δ2t+1) in exchange of the less fluctuating
consumption (cr12t , c
r1
2t+1) = (c, c). The rich country r2 follows the same strategy at odd dates 2t+1:
it saves the amount δ2t+2 to trade the endowments (y
r2
2t+1, y
r2
2t+2) = (c+δ2t+2, c−δ2t+2) in exchange
of the consumption (cr22t+1, c
r2
2t+2) = (c, c).
Finally, we define (cp, ap) as follows: cpt := ct for every t ≥ 0 and apt = −δt for every t ≥ 1. The
poor country borrows the amount δt+1 at date t to repay the debt δt and finance the consumption ct.
We next show that these allocations are indeed optimal. Observe that (cp, ap) is budget feasible
(this follows from Equation (4.2)) and satisfies the Euler equations (2.3) by construction of the
sequence (ct)t≥0. Moreover,
lim
t→∞β
tu′(ct)[−δt + δ∞] = u′(c0) lim
t→∞[−δt + δ∞] = 0,
so the transversality condition (2.4) is satisfied. This proves that (cp, ap) is optimal. The plan
(crk , ark) is also optimal since it is budget feasible (with equality) and satisfies the Euler equa-
tions (2.3) (this follows from equation (4.1)) and the transversality condition (2.4) (debt limits
bind infinitely many times).
To conclude the proof simply observe that all markets clear by construction.
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4.3. Positive Risk-less Interest Rates
In the previous examples, we had zero effective equilibrium risk-less interest rates (defined as
the difference between the risk-less interest rates and the aggregate growth rates). We show below
that our analysis is not driven by this property. More precisely, we study a stochastic economy and
exhibit a competitive equilibrium where a country borrows in excess of its natural debt limits, but
the risk-less interest rates are strictly positive and higher than the aggregate growth rates at every
period. However, in the long run, the risk-less interest rates converge to the aggregate growth rates.
This necessary condition is related to Proposition 3.1. Since the aggregate endowment is uniformly
bounded from above (no aggregate risk), if the risk-less interest rates were bounded from below by
some positive value, then the aggregate wealth of the economy would be finite and Proposition 3.1
would imply that debt limits are zero.
The essential lesson is that when self-enforcing debt limits allow for exact roll over, this effec-
tively puts a lower bound on their growth rates (they should exactly coincide with interest rates).
As long as the endowment process of an agent grows at a rate that is lower than the interest rates,
then it is possible for the debt limits to surpass the agent’s wealth. However, debt can grow as fast
as interest rates only to the extend there is someone to provide credit at infinite (in present value
terms). This necessarily requires that interest rates are low enough to imply an infinite wealth for
some creditors.
Example 4.3. The primitives (β, u(·)) together with some probability pi ∈ (0, 1) are chosen such
that there exists a pair (c, c) satisfying
0 < c < c, c+ c = 1 and 1− β(1− pi) = βpiu
′(c)
u′(c)
.
We let (qc, qnc) be defined by
qc := βpi
u′(c)
u′(c)
and qnc := β(1− pi).
Observe that qc + qnc = 1. We fix some arbitrary number δ > 0 such that qcδ < c.
We let c0 := c and c0 := c. Since c0 < c0, there exist two numbers c1 and c1 such that
c0 < c1 < c1 < c0 and c1 + c1 = 1.
Let
qc1 := βpi
u′(c1)
u′(c0)
and q1 := q
c
1 + q
nc.
Since q1 < 1, we can apply Lemma C.1 (see Appendix C) to deduce the existence of a strictly
increasing sequence (qt)t≥1 such that
lim
t→∞ qt = 1 and 0 < p∞ := limt→∞ pt where pt := q1 . . . qt.
We can construct a strictly decreasing sequence (ct)t≥1 and a strictly increasing sequence (ct)t≥1
such that, for every t ≥ 1
qct := qt − qnc = βpi
u′(ct)
u′(ct−1)
together with ct + ct = 1 (4.3)
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and
lim
t→∞(ct, ct) = (c, c).
Observe that (qct )t≥1 is strictly increasing and converges to qc.
Let also δ0 := δp∞. Since p∞ < p1 = q1 < 1, we get that δ0 < δ. Consider the sequence (δt)t≥1
defined recursively by
qt+1δt+1 := δt.
Equivalently, we have δt+1 = δ(p∞/pt+1). Therefore, the sequence (δt)t≥1 is strictly increasing and
converges to δ.
For each t ≥ 0, we pose16
yt = ct + q
c
t+1δt+1 and yt = ct − qct+1δt+1.
In each period t, one of the rich countries receives the high endowment yt and the other one receives
the low endowment y
t
. The rich countries switch endowment with probability pi from one period
to the next. Formally, uncertainty is captured by the Markov process st with state space {z1, z2}
and symmetric transition probabilities
pi := Prob(st+1 = z1|st = z2) = Prob(st+1 = z2|st = z1).
The event st corresponds to the sequence (s0, s1, . . . , st) and the endowments y
rk(st) only depend
on the current realization of st, with
yrk(st) :=
{
yt, if st = zk
y
t
, otherwise.
Observe that the sequence (y
t
)t≥0 is strictly decreasing and converges to y := c − qcδ while the
sequence (yt)t≥0 is strictly increasing and converges to y := c+ qcδ.
Country’s p endowment is defined by yp(s0) := y while for each event st  s0 we pose
yp(st) :=
{
yp(st−1), if st = st−1
γyp(st−1), otherwise
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen such that
u′(γyp(st))
u′(yp(st))
≤ u
′(c1)
u′(c0)
, for all st. (4.4)
Remark 4.1. If we let u be such that u(c) := ln(c) in the interval (0, y] while extending this function
on [y,∞) such that the assumptions of this paper are satisfied, then the inequality (4.4) is true for
any γ in the interval [c1/c1, 1).
To focus on an equilibrium displaying Markovian properties, we assume that the economy
begins in state s0 = s0 = z1 (the rich country r1 has the highest endowment) and the initial asset
positions are
ap(s0) := −δ0, ar1(s0) := 0 and ar2(s0) := δ0.
16Recall that the sequence (ct)t≥0 is strictly decreasing and converges to c while the sequence (qtδt)t≥1 is strictly
increasing and converges to qcδ. This implies that y
t
≥ limτ→∞ [cτ − qcτ+1δτ+1] = c− qcδ > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
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Proposition 4.3. The economy of Example 4.3 admits a competitive equilibrium with self-
enforcing debt in which the risk-less interest rates are strictly positive, and the country p faces
positive not-too-tight debt limits Dp(st) = δt although its natural debt limits W
p(st) are finite.
Moreover, for almost every path, the debt limits eventually exceed the country’s natural debt
limits. Formally, for any infinite path (st)t≥0 displaying infinitely many switches, we have
lim
t→∞D
p(st) = δ > 0 = lim
t→∞W
p(st). (4.5)
Remark 4.2. The strict inequality (4.5) implies that for every path (st)t≥0 displaying infinitely
many switches, there exists T ≥ 0 large enough such that, for every t ≥ T , the not-too-tight debt
limit Dp(st) exceeds the natural debt limit W p(st). Since the set of paths displaying infinitely
many switches has probability one, we get that, for almost every path, the debt limits eventually
exceed the country’s natural debt limits.
Proof. We first describe the equilibrium prices, debt limits and allocations.
Let the price process (q(st))sts0 be as follows:
q(st) :=
{
qct , if st 6= st−1
qnc, otherwise.
Since by construction qct + q
nc = qt < 1 and (qt)t≥1 converges to 1, the risk-less interest rate is time
dependent, positive and converges to zero.
Consider the following debt limits:
Dr1(st) = Dr2(st) := 0 and Dp(st) := δt.
These debt limits are not-too-tight since they allow for exact roll-over (i.e., condition (ER) holds
true).
Let (crk , ark) be defined as follows:
crk(st) :=
{
ct, if st = zk
ct, otherwise
and ark(st+1) :=
{
δt+1, if st+1 6= zk
0, otherwise.
Each rich country saves to transfer resources against the low income shock. They do not issue debt
since they are credit-constrained.
The allocation (cp, ap) is defined as follows: cp(st) := yp(st) and ap(st) := −δt for every event st.
At the initial period, the poor country repays the inherited debt δ0 by issuing the non-contingent
debt δ1. At any subsequent period t, instead of repaying its debt δt, it issues more debt (equal to
δt+1). That is, the poor country is rolling over its debt forever.
We next show that these allocations are indeed optimal. Observe that (cp, ap) is budget feasible
(with equality) and the transversality condition (2.4) is satisfied since debt limits always bind. Euler
equations (2.3) are also satisfied. Indeed, condition (4.4) implies that
βpi
u′(γyp(st))
u′(yp(st))
≤ βpiu
′(c1)
u′(c0)
≤ βpiu
′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
= qct ,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that (ct)t≥0 is strictly decreasing and (ct)t≥0 is
strictly increasing. Most importantly, we have that∑
st+1st
q(st+1)yp(st+1) ≤ (qctγ + qnc)yp(st) ≤ (qcγ + qnc)yp(st).
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Since γ ∈ (0, 1) and qc + qnc = 1, this implies that country p’s wealth (and therefore any of its
natural debt limits) is finite at any period. Indeed, if we let χ := (qcγ + qnc), we can show that
W p(st) ≤ yp(st)∑t≥0 χt = yp(st)/(1 − χ). Observe that yp(st) = γτ y¯ where τ is the number of
switches in the finite path st. This implies that
lim
t→∞W
p(st) ≤ 1
1− χ limt→∞ y
p(st) = 0
along any infinite path (s0, s1, . . .) displaying infinitely many switches.
The plan (crk , ark) is also optimal. Indeed, it is budget feasible (with equality) and satisfies
the Euler equations (2.3) (this follows from the definition of asset prices, i.e., condition (4.3)).
Moreover, the transversality condition (2.4) is satisfied because the equilibrium consumption is
bounded from below by c and the asset position is bounded from above by δ. Formally, we have∑
st∈St
βtpi(st)u′(crk(st))ark(st) ≤ βtu′(c)δt −−−→
t→∞ 0.
To conclude the proof simply observe that all markets clear by construction.
5. Conclusion
In models without commitment the creditworthiness of an agent is not necessarily limited by his
ability to repay out of his future resources. Indeed, we show, by means of examples, that an agent
can sustain positive levels of debt by acting as a financial intermediary that alleviates the incentive
compatibility constraints of some other agents. Since this financial service is not related to the
agent’s wealth, the borrowing capacity can exceed an agent’s natural ability to repay represented
by the present value of his future endowments. This is in contrast with the standard results of the
full commitment literature. Moreover, our examples show that the no-borrowing result of Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) hinges on the restrictive assumption that debt is bounded by the natural debt
limits. They also clarify that the level of interest rates is important from the creditors’ perspective:
they should be low enough to provide strong lending incentives. Indeed, repayment incentives are
guaranteed by the bubble property of debt limits independently of whether interest rates imply
that the debtors’ wealth is finite or infinite. However, the bubble property of debt limits requires
asymptotic borrowing in present value terms. This is consistent with the asymptotic supply of
credit only if interest rates are lower than the endowment growth rates of some potential lenders.
Appendix A. Market Transversality Condition
In this section we show that the market transversality condition is satisfied when the present
value of an agent’s optimal consumption is finite. Since we are exclusively concerned with the
single-agent problem, we simplify notation by dropping the superscript i.
If c is a strictly positive consumption sequence (in the sense that c(st) > 0 for every event st),
then the agent’s marginal rate of substitution at event st  s0 is denoted by
MRS(c|st) := βpi(st|σ(st))u′(c(st))/u′(c(σ(st))).
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Lemma A.1. Let b ∈ R denote an initial claim at some arbitrary event sτ and let (c, a) be optimal
in B(D, b|sτ ), where D is a process of not-too-tight debt limits. If c has finite present value, i.e.,
PV(c|sτ ) <∞, then the following market transversality condition is satisfied
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St(sτ )
p(st)[a(st) +D(st)] = 0. (A.1)
Proof. It suffices to show that for every st  sτ , we have a(st) + D(st) ≤ PV(c|st). Assume, by
way of contradiction, that there exists st  sτ such that
a(st) +D(st) > PV(c|st). (A.2)
Let θ(sr) := PV(c|sr) for every sr  st. By construction we have
c(sr) +
∑
sr+1sr
q(sr+1)θ(sr+1) = θ(sr), for all sr  st. (A.3)
Moreover, it is easy to see that17
D(sr) ≤ y(sr) +
∑
sr+1sr
q(sr+1)D(sr+1), for all sr  st. (A.4)
Posing a˜ := θ −D, it follows hat
c(sr) +
∑
sr+1sr
q(sr+1)a˜(sr+1) = a˜(sr), for all sr  st. (A.5)
Since a˜(sr) ≥ −D(sr), we get that (c, a˜) ∈ B(D, a˜(st)|st)). The bond holdings a˜ finance the
consumption c when the initial claim is a˜(st). Following Equation (A.2) we have a(st) > a˜(st).
This contradicts the optimality of a.18 Indeed, we can increase the consumption at the predecessor
event σ(st) by replacing (a(sr))sr∈Σ(st) with (a˜(sr))sr∈Σ(st).
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Before presenting the details of the proof, we introduce the following notations. Fix two
dates t > τ ≥ 0. Recall that St(sτ ) denotes the set of all date-t events that are successors of
sτ , i.e.,
St(sτ ) := {st ∈ St : st  sτ}.
If Eτ is a subset of Sτ , then we let St(Eτ ) be the set of date-t events that are successors of the
events in Eτ , i.e.,
St(Eτ ) :=
⋃
sτ∈Eτ
St(sτ ).
17Indeed, Let b = −y(sr)−∑sr+1sr q(sr+1)D(sr+1) and let (c, a) be optimal in B(D, b|sr). It is straightforward
to see that we must have c(sr) = 0 and a(sr+1) = −D(sr+1) implying that U(c|sr) = u(0) + βV (sr+1). We know
that V (sr) = J(0, 0|sr) = U(cˆ|sr) for a consumption process cˆ satisfying participation constraints at all successor
events, i.e., U(cˆ(sr+1)) ≥ V (sr+1). In particular, we have V (sr) ≥ u(cˆ(sr)) +βV (sr+1) ≥ U(c|sr) which implies that
b ≤ −D(sr).
18By the Principle of Optimality, we must have (c, a) ∈ B(D, a(st)|st).
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Proof of Proposition 3.2. Assume that one of the agents, say agent i1, has finite wealth at some
event sτ , i.e., W i1(sτ ) = PV(ei1 |sτ ) < ∞. Replacing Σ by Σ(sτ ) if necessary, we can assume
without any loss of generality, that sτ = s0. Assume, by way of contradiction, that Di1(s0) > 0.
Observe that for every t > 0, we have
PVt−1(ci|s0) +
∑
st∈St
p(st)[ai(st) +Di(st)] = PVt−1(ei|s0) + ai(s0) +Di(s0) (B.1)
where PVτ (·|s0) is the present value functional restricted to the subtree stopped at period τ .
Since agent i1 has finite wealth, we can deduce from (B.1) that PV(c
i1 |s0) is also finite. Applying
Lemma A.1, we get that the market transversality condition
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)[ai1(st) +Di1(st)] = 0 (B.2)
is satisfied. In particular, we have that
ai1(s0) +Di1(s0) = PV(ci1 − ei1 |s0).
Replacing the event tree Σ by Σ(st), we can show that
ai1(st) = PV(ci1 − ei1 |st)−Di1(st), for all st ∈ Σ. (B.3)
We let εi1 be the process defined by
εi1(st) := PV(ci1 + ei1 |st).
Observe that ai1 ≤ εi1 − Di1 . Moreover, for every event st, we have ci1(st) + ei1(st) ≥ 0. This
implies that
p(st)εi1(st) ≥
∑
st+1st
p(st+1)εi1(st+1).
Recall that
lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)εi1(st) = 0 and lim
t→∞
∑
st∈St
p(st)Di1(st) = Di1(s0) > 0
where the first equality follows from the property that PV(ei1 |s0) and PV(ci1 |s0) are both finite,
and the second one from the roll-over property of Di1 . The above equalities imply that there must
exist some date τ ≥ 0 such that∑
sτ∈Sτ
p(sτ )εi1(sτ ) <
∑
sτ∈Sτ
p(sτ )Di1(sτ ).
In particular, there must exist some event sτ ∈ Sτ such that εi1(sτ ) < Di1(sτ ). We let Eτ := {sτ}
and define Eτ+1 ⊆ Sτ+1(sτ ) as the set of successors of sτ for which we have εi1 < Di1 , i.e.,
Eτ+1 := {sτ+1 ∈ Sτ+1(sτ ) : εi1(sτ+1) < Di1(sτ+1)}.
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Observe that ∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )\Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)Di1(sτ+1) ≤
∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )\Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)εi1(sτ+1)
≤
∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )
p(sτ+1)εi1(sτ+1)
≤ p(sτ )εi1(sτ ).
Combining the above inequality with the exact roll-over property of Di1 , we deduce that∑
sτ+1∈Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)Di1(sτ+1) ≥ p(sτ )Di1(sτ )− p(sτ )εi1(sτ ) > 0 (B.4)
which implies in particular that Eτ+1 6= ∅.
We define Eτ+2 ⊆ Sτ+2(Eτ+1) as the set of all successors of the events in Eτ+1 for which we
have εi1 < Di1 , i.e.,
Eτ+2 := {sτ+2 ∈ Sτ+2(Eτ+1) : εi1(sτ+2) < Di1(sτ+2)}.
Using the exact roll-over property of Di1 and the definition of Eτ+1, we have
p(sτ )Di1(sτ ) =
∑
sτ+2∈Sτ+2(sτ )
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2)
=
∑
sτ+2∈Sτ+2(Eτ+1)
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2) +
∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )\Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)Di1(sτ+1)
≤
∑
sτ+2∈Sτ+2(Eτ+1)
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2) +
∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )\Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)εi1(sτ+1)
Observe that we can decompose the set Sτ+2(Eτ+1) as follows
Sτ+2(Eτ+1) = Eτ+2 ∪ [Sτ+2(Eτ+1) \ Eτ+2] .
Using the definition of Eτ+2, we get that∑
sτ+2∈Sτ+2(Eτ+1)
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2) ≤
∑
sτ+2∈Eτ+2
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2)
+
∑
sτ+2∈Sτ+2(Eτ+1)\Eτ+2
p(sτ+2)εi1(sτ+2)
≤
∑
sτ+2∈Eτ+2
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2)
+
∑
sτ+1∈Eτ+1
p(sτ+1)εi1(sτ+1).
Combining the above inequalities, we deduce that
p(sτ )Di1(sτ ) ≤
∑
sτ+2∈Eτ+2
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2) +
∑
sτ+1∈Sτ+1(sτ )
p(sτ+1)εi1(sτ+1)
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and therefore, we get∑
sτ+2∈Eτ+2
p(sτ+2)Di1(sτ+2) ≥ p(sτ )Di1(sτ )− p(sτ )εi1(sτ ) > 0. (B.5)
The above strict inequality is the counterpart of Equation (B.4) for period τ + 2. In particular, it
implies that Eτ+2 6= ∅.
By induction, we can construct a sequence (Eτ+n)n≥0 where Eτ+n ⊆ Sτ+n(Eτ+n−1) is defined
by
∀n > 0, Eτ+n := {sτ+n ∈ Sτ+n(Eτ+n−1) : εi1(sτ+n) < Di1(sτ+n)}.
Following the same arguments as above, we can use the exact roll-over property of Di1 to show
that ∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)Di1(sτ+n) ≥ p(sτ )Di1(sτ )− p(sτ )εi1(sτ ). (B.6)
Observe that for every n ≥ 0, the definition of Eτ+n implies that
∀sτ+n ∈ Eτ+n, ai1(sτ+n) ≤ εi1(sτ+n)−Di1(sτ+n) < 0.
Since for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have σk(Eτ+n) ⊆ Eτ+n−k, we get that
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai1(σk(sτ+n)) < 0.
Market clearing implies that agent i2 is saving strictly positive amounts along the path
(sτ = σn(sτ+n), σn−1(sτ+n), . . . , σ(sτ+n), sτ+n).
This implies that the corresponding Euler equations are satisfied with equality:
∀n ≥ 0, ∀sτ+n ∈ Eτ+n, p(s
τ+n)
p(sτ )
= βnpi(sτ+n|sτ )u
′(ci2(sτ+n))
u′(ci2(sτ ))
.
If we pose χ := βτpi(sτ )u′(ci2(sτ ))/p(sτ ), we deduce that
χ
∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)ai2(sτ+n) =
∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
βτ+npi(sτ+n)u′(ci2(sτ+n))ai2(sτ+n)
≤
∑
sτ+n∈Sτ+n
βτ+npi(sτ+n)u′(ci2(sτ+n))ai2(sτ+n).
Agent i2’s individual transversality condition implies that
lim
n→∞
∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)ai2(sτ+n) = 0.
Since markets clear, we deduce that
lim
n→∞
∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)ai1(sτ+n) = 0.
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Combining with (B.2), we get that
lim
n→∞
∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)Di1(sτ+n) = 0.
This contradicts (B.6) since we have∑
sτ+n∈Eτ+n
p(sτ+n)Di1(sτ+n) ≥ p(sτ )Di1(sτ )− p(sτ )εi1(sτ ) > 0
where the last inequality follows from the definition of sτ .
We can adapt the arguments of the proof of Proposition 3.2 to prove the following result.
Proposition B.1. If an agent with finite wealth sustains debt, then there are least two other
agents with infinite wealth.
Appendix C. Technical Result
We here present the proof of the simple technical result we use in Example 4.3.
Lemma C.1. For any q1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists a strictly increasing sequence (qt)t≥1 of positive
numbers converging to 1 such that the sequence (pt)t≥1 defined by
pt := q1 . . . qt, for all t ≥ 1
converges to some positive number p∞ ∈ (0, q1).
Observe that the sequence (pt)t≥1 is strictly decreasing and
∞∑
t=1
q1 . . . qt =
∞∑
t=1
pt =∞.
Proof of Lemma C.1. Fix an arbitrary α > 1. Observe that
∞∑
i=1
i−α <∞.
Let (κt)t≥1 be the sequence defined by
κt :=
1
exp{t−α} .
For every t ≥ 1, we have κt ∈ (0, 1), κt ≤ κt+1 and limt→∞ κt = 1. Choose τ ≥ 1 large enough
such that κτ+2 > q1 and let (qt)t≥1 be defined by
∀t ≥ 2, qt := κτ+t.
For every t ≥ 1, we have qt ∈ (0, 1), qt ≤ qt+1 and limt→∞ qt = 1. Observe moreover that
lim
t→∞ q1 . . . qt = limt→∞
q1
exp
{∑τ+t
i=τ+2 i
−α} = q1exp{∑∞i=τ+2 i−α} > 0.
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